Egocentric foundations of trust by Posten, A-C & Mussweiler, T M
LBS Research Online
A-C Posten and T M Mussweiler
Egocentric foundations of trust
Article
This version is available in the LBS Research Online repository: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/
1139/
Posten, A-C and Mussweiler, T M
(2019)
Egocentric foundations of trust.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 84 (103820).
ISSN 0022-1031
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103820
Reuse of this item is allowed under the Creative Commons licence:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Elsevier
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/...
c© 2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LBS Research Online for purposes of
research and/or private study. Further distribution of the material, or use for any commercial gain, is
not permitted.
Running head: EGOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Egocentric Foundations of Trust 
 
Ann-Christin Posten 
University of Cologne 
 
Thomas Mussweiler 
London Business School 
 
 
 
Corresponding author:  Ann-Christin Posten 
    Department of Psychology 
    University of Cologne 
    Richard-Strauss-Str. 2 
    D-50931 Cologne, Germany 
    Phone: **49 (0)221 470 4924 
    Fax: **49 (0)221 470 1216 
    Email: a-c.posten@uni-koeln.de 
 
 
Word count: 4998 (words of text) 
 
 
EGOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST  2 
 
Abstract 
Trusting the trustworthy brings benefits whereas trusting the untrustworthy brings harm. 
Discriminating between the two is key to every social encounter. We propose that humans 
turn to internal information, namely the self, when judging the trustworthiness of others. 
Simulating how oneself would behave in situations that involve trust helps to predict how a 
counterpart may behave. Importantly, using the same self as a basis for judgments about 
others may result in diverging outcomes, depending on how the information is processed. If a 
judge focuses on similarities between the self and the target person, the judge expects the 
counterpart to act alike. However, if a judge focuses on differences, the target is expected to 
behave in ways opposite to the self. In Study 1 natural variations in self-ascribed levels of 
trustworthiness correlate positively with expectations of a target person’s trustworthiness. 
Inducing a similarity-focus increases this correlation as compared to a difference-focus. 
Interestingly, this effect holds even if information speaks to the target’s trustworthiness. In 
manipulating the perception of the participants’ own trustworthiness as well as the processing 
focus, Studies 2-4 demonstrate that when individuals focus on similarities, those who 
perceive themselves as highly (vs. less) trustworthy perceive others as similarly highly (less) 
trustworthy. However, when they focus on differences, the reverse pattern tends to occur. 
These effects hold for trust judgments (Study 2-3) and trust behavior in an economic game 
(Study 4). Together, these findings demonstrate that trust involves egocentric inferences that 
are flexible enough to adjust for basic social relations.  
 
 
Keywords: trust, egocentrism, similarity, economic decisions, judgment 
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Egocentric Foundations of Trust 
Trust bears benefits and trust bears risks (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; 
Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Trusting the trustworthy holds substantial personal, 
interpersonal, and economic rewards, but trusting the untrustworthy holds serious and 
sometimes even fatal costs. Identifying which interaction partner is trustworthy and which is 
not is crucial for our personal (Koranyi & Rothermund, 2012), interpersonal (Simpson, 
2007), and economic welfare (Knack & Keefer, 1997). Regarding the pivotal importance of 
telling apart the trustworthy from the untrustworthy it is little surprising that across different 
eras and cultures, human societies have developed a broad array of devices that help to 
separate the chaff from the wheat. In medieval Europe, for example, convicted perpetrators 
were visibly marked by scars to warn future interaction partners (Du Cane, 1885). In ancient 
China, evidence for tattoos signaling criminal records can be backdated to 1100 BC (Reed, 
2000), and even within the 18th century US counterfeiters were marked through cropping 
(Staples, 1853). The modern era equivalent of such drastic measures are reputation systems 
such as those that are often used on online platforms and the like (Bolton, Katok, & 
Ockenfels, 2004).  
While such societal and institutional devices help to predict whether a counterpart will 
behave in a trustworthy manner, they are not always available. Humans often need to make 
trust predictions based on minimal, novel, or even contradicting information that they 
encounter on the spot. To do so, they rely on a rich arsenal of cues, some of which originate 
from the target person who is or is not to be trusted and some of which originate from the 
judges themselves. Of the multitude of external cues, the face of the target person seems to be 
particularly indicative to the judge. Within milliseconds, humans make trust judgments by 
looking at a counterparts’ face (Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009). In slightly longer 
interactions, a counterpart’s pupil reactions, (Kret, Fischer, & De Dreu, 2015), smiles 
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(Krumhuber et al., 2007), or blushing behavior (Dijk, Koenig, Ketelaar, & de Jong, 2011) 
co-determine the amount of trust that is experienced. In contrast to a large body of research 
that investigated such external cues to trust, internal cues – that is cues that originate in the 
perceiver rather than the perceived – have received only scarce attention. Of the identified 
internal cues, the current level of the hormone oxytocin (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, 
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005), the content of social stereotypes (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 
2009), or one’s unintentional mimicry of a counterpart’s pupil size (Kret et al., 2015) 
influence interpersonal trust. Importantly, all of these cues, external and internal in origin 
alike, are associated with considerable levels of uncertainty because they may not be 
available, difficult to interpret, or inconsistent with one another.  
Interacting with a person that has a trustworthy face, but a stereotypically 
untrustworthy group membership, or interacting with a stranger via a website that does not 
feature information about someone’s reputation may leave a judge equally puzzled about the 
counterpart’s trustworthiness. In short, humans often have to make a highly important and 
potentially consequential judgment about the trustworthiness of a person about whom they 
have little, unreliable, or contradictory information. In this situation, we suggest, they resort 
to a person about whom they have a lot of reliable information available, namely the self.  
We propose that when judging a counterpart’s trustworthiness humans consult 
information they have about themselves. Based on their self-knowledge, they simulate how 
they would behave in the upcoming situation and use this information as a basis for their 
judgment. This hypothesis is in line with research demonstrating that humans tend to be 
egocentric when judging others (Cho & Knowles, 2013; Dunning & Hayes, 1996; Ross, 
Greene, & House, 1977). While trust research has increased its interest in internal cues, it has 
largely ignored the self as one of the most natural sources of such information. Information 
about the self is abundant, relatively certain, chronically accessible, and automatically 
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activated whenever another person is judged (Dunning & Hayes, 1996; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 
1984; Mussweiler, 2003a), even though it may be biased (John & Robins, 1994; Zell & 
Krizan, 2014). While in principle also information about persons different from the self can 
help judges to predict how a target person may behave (Mussweiler, 2003b), typically 
individuals initially refer to the self when judging others (Dunning & Hayes, 1996). When 
asked about how they judge other’s behavior, people report that they use their own behavior 
as a basis (Dunning & Hayes, 1996). Moreover, upon judging others, individuals can access 
information about themselves faster, suggesting that it had been activated while judging 
others (Dunning & Hayes, 1996).  
Importantly, the self can serve as a base for judgments about others in two different 
ways that yield distinct outcomes. How egocentric thinking influences judgments about 
others critically depends on whether information processing highlights self-other similarities 
or differences. If a counterpart is perceived to be similar to the self, the judge selectively 
attends to evidence that indicates that the target thinks, feels, and acts alike. Consequently, 
the target is assimilated to the self. However, if a counterpart is perceived to be different from 
the self, the judge selectively attends to information that indicates that the counterpart is 
different. Predictions about the target on a critical dimension will be based on evidence 
stressing differences between the self and the target. Accordingly, the judge predicts the 
target to behave in ways opposite to oneself (Mussweiler, 2003a). Manifold psychological 
studies document assimilation and contrast as two dominant outcomes in social judgment 
(Biernat, 2012; Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Remarkably, judging the 
very same target using the very same self as a reference can thus result in two opposing target 
judgments, depending on whether self-other similarities or differences are emphasized. 
The upshot of this reasoning is that the decision to trust depends on two components, 
(a) one’s own perceived level of trustworthiness and (b) whether one focuses on self-other 
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similarities or differences. In specific, people who focus on similarities should assimilate 
others’ trustworthiness toward their own level of trustworthiness. This leads to high trust for 
people who see themselves as trustworthy and to low trust for people who see themselves as 
untrustworthy. The reverse should occur when people focus on differences. 
The first component of our hypothesis holds that people use themselves as an internal 
source of information when deciding whether to trust or not to trust others. Consequently, the 
extent to which they trust others depends on the level of trustworthiness they ascribe to 
themselves. The second component of our hypothesis holds that how these different levels of 
self-trustworthiness influence the decision to trust others critically depends on whether self-
other similarities or differences are highlighted. To examine the influence of the self, in Study 
1, we measured how trustworthy participants perceived themselves to be. Then we 
unobtrusively manipulated a focus on similarities versus differences using a content-free 
procedural priming task that influences information processing in subsequent tasks 
(Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler & Ockenfels, 2013). We assessed judgments of 
trustworthiness in information-rich environments in which participants can infer 
trustworthiness directly from portrait pictures of the target. In Studies 2-3, we experimentally 
manipulated how trustworthy participants perceive themselves to be before experimentally 
directing their processing focus on either similarities or differences. We then measured trust 
judgments in information scarce paradigms (Study 2 and 3) and trust behavior (Study 4) in an 
incentivized economic trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). In sum, four studies 
systematically test for the egocentric nature of trust, by measuring and varying (a) the 
perceived self-trustworthiness and (b) a focus on self-other similarities versus differences.  
Study 1 
Study 1 investigates whether egocentric processes influence trust judgments of others 
in the presence of trustworthiness-indicating target information. 
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Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 3791 participants (206 female; Mage = 40.10, 
SD = 11.94) on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in exchange for $0.50. Participants 
were randomly assigned to a one-factorial between-subjects design (focus: similarity vs. 
difference) with a correlational factor. To detect a medium effect of q  = 0.3 between two 
independent correlations with a power of .80, apriori power calculations using G*Power 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) suggested a total sample size of N = 356. The study 
was preregistered at aspredicted.org with the aim of recruiting 400 participants and a 
comparison of the correlations between the experimental conditions as planned analysis 
(http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=py2dz4). Materials, de-identified data, and analysis 
scripts of all studies are available online via mendeley.com. 
Materials and procedure. . 
Self-trustworthiness measure. To assess participants’ self-ascribed level of 
trustworthiness, we asked them to imagine nine situations that involve trust-related 
interactions between themselves and a stranger. For instance, they were asked how likely 
they would watch a stranger’s bag while the stranger was swimming in a lake. The critical 
trustworthiness question asked how likely they would leave the stranger’s bag unattended. 
Three scenarios were reverse-coded. 
Focus manipulation. To induce a processing focus on similarities versus differences, 
participants worked on a paper-pencil procedural priming task. This task is designed to 
induce similarity- versus difference-focused information processing (Mussweiler, 2003b). 
Participants looked at three pairs of pictures, displayed on consecutive screens. For each pair, 
they listed three similarities or three differences between the individual pictures (Crusius & 
Mussweiler, 2012).  
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Trust measure. Participants judged the trustworthiness of others within the same 
nine situations as in the self-trustworthiness measure. This time, they were asked to imagine 
being in the role of the trustor and predict the trustworthiness of their counterpart, portrayed 
on a picture. To increase the ecologic validity, the pictures presented either a trustworthy or 
untrustworthy person (portraits taken from Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2008, p. 1299), 
counterbalanced between-subjects. This time, the corresponding trust question asked how 
likely their counterpart would leave their bag unattended while they were swimming.  
Results 
We expected that a similarity-focus aligns participants expectations of others 
trustworthiness more with their own perceived self-trustworthiness than a difference-focus. 
Therefore, we expected the correlation between the perceived self-trustworthiness and the 
expected trustworthiness of the stranger to be higher in the similarity-focus condition (n = 
184) as compared to the difference-focus condition (n = 195). We averaged the self-
judgments (Cronbach’s Alpha = .593) and the other-judgments (Cronbach’s Alpha = .802) 
into two independent trust indices. As predicted, in the similarity-focus condition, the 
perceived trustworthiness of the participants correlated significantly higher with the expected 
trustworthiness of the counterpart (r = .355, p < .001) than in the difference-focus condition 
(r = .149, p = .038), z = 2.143, p = .032.  
A stimuli manipulation check revealed that the trustworthy-looking target was judged 
as more trustworthy (M = 60.62, SD = 16.28) than the untrustworthy-looking target (M = 
43.94, SD = 18.54), t(3672) = 9.30, p < .001. This indicates, that in addition to egocentric 
information trust-relevant target information was incorporated in the judgments (see 
Supplementary Materials for further analysis).  
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Overall, these results demonstrate that the self is used as basis for judgments of 
others’ trustworthiness even in the presence of strong trust-indicating visual information and, 
hence, egocentric processes seem to be an important contributor to interpersonal trust.  
These results demonstrate that the influence of egocentric information depends on 
whether a focus on similarities or differences is present. Notably, we do not find evidence of 
contrast under a difference-focus, which could be apparent in a negative correlation. We 
reason that this might be due to methodological specifics of Study 1. First, participants 
judged their own level of trustworthiness in the context of the exact same scenarios in which 
they then judged the trustworthiness of the target. This is likely to foster assimilative 
tendencies in at least two distinct ways. For one, imagining oneself and the target person in 
the exact same situation highlights self-other similarities that are likely to work against the 
induced difference-focus. Furthermore, imaging behavior in these scenarios twice highlights 
the power of situational constraints which make it more difficult to imagine that someone else 
may behave in drastically different ways. Both of these mechanisms work against the 
hypothesized contrastive influence of an induced content-free difference-focus. Third, from a 
methodological point of view, in this correlational design the counterpart’s behavior could 
potentially be contrasted upwards or downwards from one’s own trustworthiness. It is not as 
clear which direction a contrast would go. Fourth, for a negative correlation to occur, 
individuals who see themselves as highly trustworthy (or untrustworthy) would need to 
deviate in their judgments of the target stronger from their own anticipated behavior than 
participants who are rather centered on the self-trustworthiness dimension. Thus, overall, we 
feel that Study 1 might not have been ideal to identify contrast.  
Study 2 
To remedy these shortcomings, Study 2 differs in three substantial ways: First, we 
used two different paradigms for self-trustworthiness and other-trustworthiness. Second, to 
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make any possible contrast effect methodologically better measurable, we experimentally 
manipulated participants’ own trustworthiness. This should clarify in which direction contrast 
effects occur and at the same time would not require differences in the deviation between 
self- and other-judgments dependent on one’s own standing on the trustworthiness 
dimension. Third, to isolate the effect of the self on the judgment of others’ trustworthiness, 
we used an information-scarce paradigm that holds few information about the trustee. 
Method 
Participants and design. On campus of a German university, 169 (22 female; Mage = 
25.01, SD = 3.96) participants participated in exchange for a chocolate bar or coffee voucher. 
We used a 2 (Own Trustworthiness: high vs. low) x 2 (Focus: self-other similarity vs. 
difference) between-subjects experimental design. Particularly, (i) we experimentally varied 
the degree of trustworthiness that people ascribed to themselves with a scale-manipulation 
(Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & Strack, 1985) and (ii) manipulated whether participants 
focused on similarities versus differences (Mussweiler, 2003b). Subsequently, we measured 
how likely (0-100%) participants estimated strangers to act in a trustworthy manner. We 
randomly assigned participants to the experimental conditions. The sample size of 169 
participants allowed to find a medium effect of f = 0.25 with a power of .90.  
Materials and procedure. Participants worked on a personal computer in separate 
cubicles in the lab.  
Self-trustworthiness manipulation. The first task was a scale manipulation (Schwarz 
et al., 1985) designed to influence the level of participants’ perceived own trustworthiness. 
We asked participants to think about how often they had interacted with other persons during 
the last month and put their own interests first – even though the actions may have been to the 
other individuals’ disadvantage. We specified that these situations include behavior such as 
bringing forward little lies, declining a favor one had previously agreed to do, or reporting 
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contents of a private conversation to third parties. A pretest (n = 42; 26 female; one 
missing gender information) that we conducted on campus revealed that on average 
participants reported that they had engaged in such untrustworthy behavior about five times 
during the last month (M = 5.18, SD = 4.38). To account for extreme outliers, one answer that 
exceeded the mean by more than 5 standard deviations was excluded. Building on the results 
of the pretest, we asked participants in the main study to mark the frequency of this kind of 
behavior on a scale displayed on the subsequent screen. The scale was the critical 
trustworthiness manipulation. The scale depicted the (average) number five either on the 
upper end or on the lower end. In the low-own-trustworthiness condition, participants saw a 
scale representing the following frequencies of untrustworthy behavior: “0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5”. 
Thus, the number five appeared on the upper end of the scale. Participants in the high-own-
trustworthiness condition saw a scale portraying the following ranges of numbers: “≤5, 6-10, 
11-15, 16-20, 21-25, >25”. This time, we placed the number five on the lower end of the 
scale. According to the logic that participants would use the scale as a reference frame to 
infer their own relative standing on the trust dimension, this scale affects their self-perception 
(Schwarz et al., 1985). For example, a participant reporting the average of five instances of 
untrustworthy behavior should infer the following depending on the experimental condition: 
In the low-own-trustworthiness condition in which five constitutes the high-end reference 
point of untrustworthy behavior, five instances indicate a high frequency of untrustworthy 
behavior. In the high-own-trustworthiness condition, however, in which the number five 
represents the low end of the scale, the exact same number of five indicates a low frequency 
of untrustworthy behavior. Using the scale to make an inference of one’s own standing 
should hence lead to a low perception of one’s own trustworthiness in the former case and a 
high perception of one’s own trustworthiness in the latter case. 
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Focus manipulation. To induce a focus on similarities versus differences, 
participants worked on a paper-pencil procedural priming task (Mussweiler, 2001; 
Mussweiler, 2003b). They compared two black-and-white drawings and listed similarities or 
differences between them (Corcoran, Hundhammer, & Mussweiler, 2009).  
Trust measure. Participants then judged the trustworthiness of others. They judged 
how trustworthy an interaction partner would behave in the scenarios of Study 1. This time, 
they did not receive visual information about their counterpart.  
Mood. Then, we asked participants about their current mood (1 = not at all good; 9 = 
very good).  
Results 
We hypothesized that participants who previously engaged in similarity-focused 
processing assimilate the trustworthiness of others toward their own perceived level of 
trustworthiness. Hence, we expected them to judge others as more trustworthy if they 
perceived themselves to be highly trustworthy. However, we expected participants with a 
difference-focus to contrast others’ trustworthiness away from their own perceived level of 
trustworthiness. Thus, we anticipated them to trust others less when they perceived 
themselves to be highly trustworthy. Again, we averaged the trust judgments across the 
scenarios into one trust-index (Cronbach’s Alpha = .67). We submitted this index to a 2 (Own 
Trustworthiness: high vs. low) x 2 (Focus: similarity vs. difference) between-subjects 
ANOVA. The means (Table 1) revealed that the focus manipulation differentially affected 
trust judgments for participants with a high versus low perceived own level of 
trustworthiness. This resulted in a significant interaction effect, F(1, 165) = 8.54, p = .004, η²p 
= .049. Specifically, a similarity-focus led participants to trust more in the high-own-
trustworthiness condition compared to the low-own-trustworthiness condition, F(1, 165) = 
5.99, p = .015, d = 0.52. The reverse pattern emerged under a difference-focus. In that case, 
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high levels of perceived own trustworthiness tended to lead to lower trust ratings of 
strangers compared to low levels of perceived own trustworthiness, F(1, 165) = 2.83, p = 
.094, d = 0.39. Neither the main effect for focus, F(1, 165) = 2.56, p = .112, nor the main 
effect for own trustworthiness, F(1, 165) = 0.30, p = .583, reached significance.  
 
Table 1 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Trust Ratings as a Function of Own 
Trustworthiness and Processing in Study 2 
 
Own Trust-
worthiness 
Focus 
Similarity  Difference  
 n  M (SD)  n  M (SD)  
High 44 61.27 (11.38)  41 52.21 (12.61)  
Low 40 54.31 (15.72)  44 56.96 (12.19)  
 
To investigate the influence of the manipulations on participants’ mood, we entered 
mood as a dependent variable into the same 2 (Own Trustworthiness: high vs. low) x 2 
(Focus: similarity vs. difference) between-subjects ANOVA. Neither a main effect of own 
trustworthiness (Mlow = 5.94, SD = 1.63; Mhigh = 6.01, SD = 1.54), F(1, 165) = 0.10, p = .748, 
nor a main effect of focus (Msim = 5.88, SD = 1.75; Mdiff = 6.07, SD = 1.40), F(1, 165) = 0.62, 
p = 0.433, or interaction was found, F(1, 165) = 0.08, p = .783. 
Study 3 
Study 3 uses an US online sample to replicate Study 2 with an increased sample size.  
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 488 participants (234 female; Mage = 34.75, 
SD = 11.55) via MTurk in exchange for $0.75. Accounting for a possibly smaller effect 
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within an online sample, this sample size allowed us to find a small effect of η² = .02 with a 
power of .88. Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions using the 
same design as in Study 2.  
Materials and procedure.  
Self-trustworthiness manipulation. The first task was an English version of the scale-
manipulation used in Study 2. An independent pretest (n = 44; 15 female; Mage = 30.93, SD = 
9.70) demonstrated that on MTurk participants reported about comparable amounts of 
untrustworthy acts during the last month as in the German lab sample (M = 4.68, SD = 5.23). 
This suggests that the critical value of five is also suitable as an end-point for the scale 
manipulation with a US MTurk sample.  
Focus manipulation. To alter their processing focus, participants worked on the same 
task as in Study 1. 
Trust measure. To measure trust, we used the same set of scenarios as in Study 2.  
Results 
We expected participants with a similarity-focus to assimilate others’ trustworthiness 
toward their own perceived trustworthiness. Hence, we expected that participants in the high-
own-trustworthiness condition would judge others to be more trustworthy than participants in 
the low-own-trustworthiness condition. For the difference-focus condition, we expected the 
opposite pattern of results. We calculated the average trust score as in the previous studies 
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .63) and submitted this index to a 2 (Own Trustworthiness: high vs. 
low) x 2 (Focus: similarity vs. difference) between-subjects ANOVA. Indeed, the observed 
pattern of means (Table 2) resulted in the hypothesized interaction effect, F(1, 484) = 10.24, 
p = .001, η² = .021.  
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Table 2  
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Trust Ratings as a Function of Own 
Trustworthiness and Processing Focus in Study 3 
 
Own Trust-
worthiness 
Focus 
Similarity  Difference  
 n  M (SD)  n  M (SD)  
High 110 52.82 (12.77)  128 49.33 (13.74)  
Low 130 48.45 (14.23)  120 52.73 (12.60)  
 
Similarity-focused participants trusted more in the high-own-trustworthiness 
condition than they did in the low-own-trustworthiness condition, F(1, 484) = 6.36, p = .012, 
d = 0.32. The opposite pattern emerged under a difference-focus. Participants tended to trust 
more in the low-own-trustworthiness condition than in the high-own-trustworthiness 
condition, F(1, 484) = 3.99, p = .046, d = 0.26. None of the main effects reached significance, 
all F’s < 0.17, p’s > .689. 
Study 4 
Study 4 tests whether this effect holds for trust behavior in an incentivized one-shot 
two-person trust game (Berg et al., 1995).  
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 370 participants (156 female, Mage = 32.46, 
SD = 11.83) via MTurk. We randomly assigned them to the role of the trustor (n = 184) or the 
trustee in an incentivized two-person trust game. We determined a total sample size of at least 
155 participants in the role of the trustee, based on power analysis of an estimated effect size 
of .049 (as obtained in Study 2) and a desired power of .80 with an alpha level of .05. 
Participants received a compensation of $0.25 plus a bonus ($0-1.80) dependent on the 
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outcome of the incentivized trust game. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
conditions. 
Materials and procedure.  
Self-trustworthiness manipulation. We used the same scale-manipulation as in Study 
3.  
Focus manipulation. Participants worked on the same procedural priming task as in 
Study 3 to influence their processing focus.  
Trust measure. Participants engaged in the strategy version of an incentivized two-
person one-shot trust game (Berg et al., 1995). All instructions of the game were visible to all 
players. Each of our critical participants was in the role of the trustor and upon completion of 
the study randomly matched with another MTurker who had participated in the role of the 
trustee. Each trustor received an initial endowment of $0.60, of which they could send any 
amount in increments of $0.10 to the trustee. Each amount sent was tripled. The trustee could 
return any portion of the amount received back to the trustor. The amount returned did not 
change in value. To match trustors and trustees randomly upon completion of the study, all 
trustees specified their return for each potential amount received. 
Results 
We expected participants who had engaged in similarity-focused processing to trust 
more if they perceived themselves to be highly trustworthy and less if they perceived 
themselves to be low in trustworthiness. For participants who had engaged in difference-
focused processing, we expected the reverse pattern. To test this hypothesis, we submitted the 
amount sent (in US dollar) by the trustor to a 2 (Own Trustworthiness: high vs. low) x 2 
(Focus: similarity vs. difference) between-subjects ANOVA. As Table 3 reveals, this was 
indeed the case. The pattern of results yielded a significant interaction effect, F(1, 180) = 
9.35, p = .003, η²p = .049. Participants with a similarity-focus trusted more in the high-own-
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trustworthiness condition than in the low-own-trustworthiness condition F(1, 180) = 5.03, 
p = .026, d = 0.48. However, participants with a difference-focus trusted less in the high-
own-trustworthiness condition than in the low-own-trustworthiness condition, F(1, 180) = 
4.33, p = .039, d = 0.43. None of the main effects reached significance, all F’s < 0.14, all p’s 
≥ .718. 
 
 
Table 3 
Mean Sending Behavior (and Standard Deviations) and Conditional Median Return 
in the Trust Game (in ¢) as a Function of Focus and Own Trustworthiness in Study 4.  
 
 
Focus 
Own Trust- 
worthiness 
Similarity Difference 
 
 Amount Sent Return  Amount Sent Return 
 n M (SD) M (SD) n M (SD)  M (SD) 
High 44 37.73 (20.10) 46.36 (28.83) 50 27.60 (20.46) 32.45 (27.87) 
Low 47 28.30 (19.26) 32.55 (25.97) 43 36.28 (20.36) 44.01 (29.24) 
 
Analyzing the return rates revealed that trusting did not come at the cost of the 
trustors (see Table 3). Across all conditions, the typical return rate (for further analysis see 
Supplementary Materials; Figure S1 and Figure S2), represented by the conditional median 
return3 (M = 38.51, SD = 28.46), significantly exceeded the trustor’s initial sending amount 
(M = 32.23, SD = 20.40), t(183) = 9.73, p < .001. This is also true for each of the individual 
experimental conditions (all ts ≥ 3.82, ps < .001).  
Notably, not only in Study 1, but also across the three experimental Studies 2-4, the 
similarity-focus evoked a stronger effect than the difference-focus. In the context of Study 2, 
this even results in a non-significant effect in the difference-focus condition. In light of this 
divergence, we further explored the robustness of the contrast effects obtained in Studies 2 
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through 4. To test for the overall reliability of the effect, we conducted a meta-analysis (cf. 
Rosenthal, 1991) across Studies 2 to 4 using the Stouffer method (weighted for dfs). The 
results reveal that the difference-focus provoked contrast effect seems to be reliable (z = 2.97, 
p = .003). However, in light of the partial divergence in the results of the experimental 
Studies 2-4 and Study 1, it seems most prudent to conclude a difference-focus at least works 
against egocentric assimilation effects and might – under some conditions – result in contrast 
effects.  
Discussion 
Four studies demonstrate how people’s self-perception of trustworthiness in 
conjunction with their focus on self-other similarities versus differences shape trust 
judgments of and trust behavior towards others. Particularly, when individuals focused on 
self-other similarities, those who perceived themselves as highly trustworthy also trusted 
more. However, when they perceived themselves as less trustworthy, they also trusted less. In 
the correlational design of Study 1, a difference-focus reduced assimilation. In the 
experimental Studies 2-4 contrast effects tended to occur when participants focused on self-
other differences. Study 1 highlights the importance of the self as a source of trust formation 
by showing that the self informs trust judgments even when strong cues about another 
person’s trustworthiness are present.  
In general, powerful social and cognitive pressures make a similarity-focus the default 
in social information processing (Mussweiler, 2003b). This is the case because humans seek 
company of similar others (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), similarities often 
constitute the starting-point of comparison (Gentner & Markman, 1994), are processed more 
efficiently (Corcoran et al., 2009), and reduce uncertainty (Posten & Mussweiler, 2017). 
Trust has been shown to foster default information processing (Schul et al., 2008), including 
similarity-focused processing. Distrust fosters difference-oriented processing (Posten & 
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Mussweiler, 2013). This gives rise to an interesting possibility. The present findings show 
that a similarity- as well as a difference-focus can result in higher or lower trust. Once 
content information about one’s own trustworthiness as a standard of comparison has been 
activated, consequentially a trust or distrust mindset might also be elicited, involving a focus 
on similarities or differences. In principle, this focus can be congruent or incongruent to the 
initial mindset-eliciting similarity-or difference-focus and augment or attenuate it, depending 
on its compatibility. For instance, if people activate trustworthy content information about 
themselves and engage in similarity-focused processing, a trust mindset might arise and 
augment the similarity-focus leading to even higher trust. Shedding light on this potentially 
complex interplay of different processing foci is an interesting avenue for future research.  
In the present research, the effect of egocentrism on trust behavior was apparent in an 
incentivized trust game as well as in trust judgments within information scarce and 
information richer judgmental situations. The many existing versions of the trust game 
foreshadow how complex the measurement of trust is (for a meta-analysis see Johnson & 
Mislin, 2011). However, by triangulating the different measures used in the present set of 
studies and by finding converging results, we feel confident that the studies captured central 
aspects of trust and generalize to further trust-involving situations.  
Trust is inherently related to the self. Trusting someone means by definition to expect 
the other person to take one’s own personal interests into account and to make oneself 
vulnerable to the other person (Rousseau et al., 1998; Schoorman et al., 2007). This is 
fundamentally different from other evaluative dimensions. Considering a person as fast, nice, 
or adventurous does not necessarily imply the self. Therefore, investigating how self-
information influences the evaluation of the counterpart seems to be especially meaningful in 
the case of trust. At the same time, recognizing egocentrism as one instance of a more general 
tendency to engage in comparison processes suggests that standards other than the self (e.g., 
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other people, numeric standards) may also influence judgments about a target's 
trustworthiness. Whether this is indeed the case, and if so, to which extent, will need to be 
clarified by future research.  
The present set of studies provides evidence for the self as a powerful internal cue that 
provides humans with accessible information to judge a counterpart’s trustworthiness. 
Evaluating the trustworthiness of another person thus appears as an egocentric process. If 
people see themselves as trustworthy and focus on ways in which others are similar to them – 
by default – this egocentric process fosters trust in others. At the same time, the egocentric 
processes that underlie trust judgments allow for the flexibility that is required to reap the 
benefits of trust and protect oneself from its potential downfalls. Specifically, interactions in 
which people often experience trusting as a risky strategy – such as those with distant others 
– typically activate a focus on self-other difference that in turn lowers trust. The egocentric 
foundations of trust thus provide people as social information processors with the flexibility 
they need to successfully navigate their complex and often unpredictable social worlds.  
 
Funding 
This work was supported by the German Science Foundation (DFG) through a 
research Unit (FOR 1271) and a Leibniz award awarded to Thomas Mussweiler.  
 
Author contributions 
All authors contributed to the study concepts and design. Testing and data collection 
were performed by A.-C. Posten. A.-C. Posten drafted the manuscript, and T. Mussweiler 
provided critical revisions. All authors approved the final version of the manuscript for 
submission.  
Disclosure statement 
EGOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST  21 
We confirm that for each study reported in the manuscript, the total number of 
excluded observations and the reasons for making these exclusions have been reported in the 
Method sections. We confirm that all independent variables or manipulations, whether 
successful or failed, have been reported in the Method sections. We confirm that all 
dependent variables or measures that were analyzed for this article’s target research question 
have been reported in the Methods sections. In Study 2, we analyzed the data after half of the 
data had been collected (n = 81). We found a significant interaction effect, as we predicted, 
but not all predicted contrasts were significant. We collected the second half of the 
participants afterwards.  
Open practice and data statement 
Study 1 was the only formally preregistered study. Materials and de-identified data of 
all studies along with the data analysis scripts are available on mendeley.com. 
 
Ethical considerations 
The conducted studies fully complied with the ethical guideline of the Association of 
German Professional Psychologists and the German Psychological Association (BDP & 
DGPs).   
 
EGOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST  22 
References 
 
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142. doi:10.1006/game.1995.1027 
Biernat, M. (2012). Standards and expectancies: contrast and assimilation in judgments of 
self and others. New York, NY: Psychology Press. 
http://www.tandfebooks.com/action/showBook?doi=10.4324/9780203338933 
Bolton, G. E., Katok, E., & Ockenfels, A. (2004). How effective are electronic reputation 
mechanisms? An experimental investigation. Management Science, 50, 1587–1602. 
doi:10.1287/mnsc.1030.0199 
Cho, J. C., & Knowles, E. D. (2013). I’m like you and you’re like me: Social projection and 
self-stereotyping both help explain self–other correspondence. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 104, 444–456. doi:10.1037/a0031017 
Corcoran, K., Hundhammer, T., & Mussweiler, T. (2009). A tool for thought! When 
comparative thinking reduces stereotyping effects. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 45, 1008–1011. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.015 
Crusius, J., & Mussweiler, T. (2012). To achieve or not to achieve? Comparative mindsets 
elicit assimilation and contrast in goal priming. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 42, 780–788. doi:10.1002/ejsp.873 
Dijk, C., Koenig, B., Ketelaar, T., & de Jong, P. J. (2011). Saved by the blush: Being trusted 
despite defecting. Emotion, 11, 313–319. doi:10.1037/a0022774 
Du Cane, E. F. (1885). The punishment and prevention of crime. The English citizen: His 
rights and responsibilities. London : Macmillan. 
Dunning, D., & Hayes, A. F. (1996). Evidence for egocentric comparison in social judgment. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 213–229. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.71.2.213 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E. ., Lang, A. G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: a flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39, 175–191. 
EGOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST  23 
Foddy, M., Platow, M. J., & Yamagishi, T. (2009). Group-based trust in strangers: The role 
of stereotypes and expectations. Psychological Science, 20, 419–422. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02312.x 
Gentner, D., & Markman, A. B. (1994). Structural alignment in comparison: No difference 
without similarity. Psychological Science, 5, 152–158. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.1994.tb00652.x 
John, O. P., & Robins, R. W. (1994). Accuracy and bias in self-perception: Individual 
differences in self-enhancement and the role of narcissism. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 66, 206–219. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.1.206 
Johnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 32, 865–889. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007 
Kihlstrom, J. F., & Cantor, N. (1984). Mental representations of the self. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 17, pp. 1–47). Elsevier. 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0065260108601173 
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-
country investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1251–1288. 
doi:10.1162/003355300555475 
Koranyi, N., & Rothermund, K. (2012). Automatic coping mechanisms in committed 
relationships: Increased interpersonal trust as a response to stress. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 180–185. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.06.009 
Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin 
increases trust in humans. Nature, 435, 673–676. doi:10.1038/nature03701 
Kret, M. E., Fischer, A. H., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2015). Pupil mimicry correlates with trust 
in in-group partners with dilating pupils. Psychological Science, 26, 1401–1410. 
doi:10.1177/0956797615588306 
Krumhuber, E., Manstead, A. S. R., Cosker, D., Marshall, D., Rosin, P. L., & Kappas, A. 
(2007). Facial dynamics as indicators of trustworthiness and cooperative Behavior. 
Emotion, 7, 730–735. 
EGOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST  24 
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in 
Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 21, 415–444. 
Mussweiler, T. (2002). The Malleability of Anchoring Effects. Experimental Psychology 
(formerly “Zeitschrift für Experimentelle Psychologie”), 49, 67–72. 
doi:10.1027//1618-3169.49.1.67 
Mussweiler, T. (2003a). When egocentrism breeds distinctness--Comparison processes in 
social prediction: Comment on Karniol (2003). Psychological Review, 110, 581–584. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.3.581 
Mussweiler, T. (2003b). Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and 
consequences. Psychological Review, 110, 472–489. doi:10.1037/0033-
295X.110.3.472 
Mussweiler, T., & Ockenfels, A. (2013). Similarity increases altruistic punishment in 
humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110, 19318–19323. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1215443110 
Posten, A.-C., & Mussweiler, T. (2013). When distrust frees your mind: The stereotype-
reducing effects of distrust. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105, 567–
584. doi:10.1037/a0033170 
Posten, A.-C., & Mussweiler, T. (2017). That certain something! Focusing on similarities 
reduces judgmental uncertainty. Cognition, 165, 121–125. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.010 
Reed, C. E. (2000). Tattoo in Early China. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 120. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/606008 
Rosenthal, R. (1991). Meta-analytic procedures for social research. Sage: Newbury Park, 
CA. 
Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in 
social perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 13, 279–301. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(77)90049-X 
EGOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST  25 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: 
A cross-discipline view of trust. Acedemy of Management Review, 23, 393–404. 
doi:10.5465/AMR.1998.926617 
Schoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. (2007). An integrative model of 
organizational trust: Past, present, and future. Academy of Management Review, 32, 
344–354. doi:10.5465/AMR.2007.24348410 
Schul, Y., Mayo, R., & Burnstein, E. (2008). The value of distrust. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 44, 1293–1302. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.05.003 
Schwarz, N., & Bless, H. (1992). Constructing reality and its alternatives: An 
inclusion/exclusion model of assimilation and contrast effects in social judgment. In 
L. L. Martin & A. Tesser (Eds.), The construction of social judgments (pp. 217–245). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Schwarz, N., Hippler, H. J., Deutsch, B., & Strack, F. (1985). Response scales: Effects of 
category range on reported behavior and comparative judgements. Public Opinion 
quaterly, 49, 388–395. 
Sherif, M., & Hovland, C. I. (1961). Social judgment: Assimilation and contrast effects in 
communication and attitude change. Oxford, UK: Yale University Press. 
Simpson, J. A. (2007). Psychological foundations of trust. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 16, 264–268. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00517.x 
Staples, W. R. (1853). History of the criminal law or Rhode Island. Library Archieve. 
http://helindigitalcommons.org/lawarchive/2 
Todorov, A., Pakrashi, M., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2009). Evaluating faces on trustworthiness 
after minimal time exposure. Social Cognition, 27, 813–833. 
doi:10.1521/soco.2009.27.6.813 
Zell, E., & Krizan, Z. (2014). Do People Have Insight Into Their Abilities? A Metasynthesis. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 111–125. doi:10.1177/1745691613518075 
 
EGOCENTRIC FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST  26 
Footnote 
1All study descriptions include all data gathered. Analyzing criteria were set to adult 
native speakers (i.e. English in Study 1, 3, and 4 and German in Study 2) that did not know 
the study materials, finished the study in the required order, did not consume alcohol, or were 
not distracted (Meade & Craig, 2012). In the online studies 1, 3, and 4 to be eligible for 
participation, participants were required to be located in the US, and have an approval rating 
in previous MTurk tasks of ≥ 95%. Participants who reported being medium or highly 
distracted (value ≥ 4 on a 9-point scale) were excluded. This led to the exclusion of 24 
participants in Study 1, 8 participants in the pretest of Study 2, 50 participants in Study 2, 70 
participants in Study 3, 29 participants in in the role of the trustor and 80 participants in the 
role of the trustee in Study 4. 
2 Degrees of freedom were adjusted for unequal variances, F(1, 377) = 4.97, p = .026. 
3 Analyzing the mean return rates revealed the same significant results across all 
treatments, t(183) = 8.37, p < .001, and for each individual treatment, (all ts ≥ 3.26, ps < 
.002).  
                                                 
